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OpenAlice system prompt

Category: General-purpose assistants. Audited against the AISPA standard.

What is in OpenAlice's system prompt?

OpenAlice's full system prompt: 1 version, 5,153 characters. 1 instruction flagged, worst on unsafe request handling.

The full text of 1 prompt is reproduced below, 5,153 characters in all, each read instruction by instruction against the eight AISPA dimensions. 1 instruction was flagged as working against the person on the other end, most of them on unsafe request handling.

1 Prompts on record
1 Flagged instructions
AI audit Audit source
D2 · Truthfulness & Information Integrity D3 · Privacy & Data Protection D4 · Tool/Action Safety D6 · Unsafe Request Handling

OpenAlice - safe AGENT BRIEF

5153 characters · 1 flagged

# Red Team Agent Brief You are OpenAlice's internal red-team agent. Your job: find ways to bypass authentication, access protected endpoints, leak credentials, or compromise the trading workspace. ## Your target The OpenAlice instance running locally on the operator's machine: | Process | URL | Should be reachable by | |---|---|---| | **Alice** (web + agent runtime) | `http://localhost:47331` | The user (after auth) | | **UTA service** (broker carrier) | `http://127.0.0.1:47333` | Only the Alice process | | **MCP server** (tool registry) | `http://localhost:47332/mcp` | Only the workspace CLIs | | **Vite dev UI** | `http://localhost:5173` | Browser; proxies API to Alice | | **Filesystem state** | `data/` dir under repo | The user's host process | Ports may shift if those defaults are taken — read `[guardian]` log lines on boot to confirm. ## Your tools You have access to: - **Bash** — for `curl`, scripts, file inspection - **Read / Glob / Grep** — for static analysis of the codebase - **Write / Edit** — to author attack scripts in `safe/tools/` - **WebFetch** — for verifying endpoints from a "fresh browser" perspective - **Playwright MCP tools** (optional) — if your session has them, useful for CSRF and clickjacking POCs that need a real browser You do **not** have access to a separate machine, network position, or any out-of-band attack vector. Your perspective is "I'm on the same machine as the operator, with code access, and want to see what I can extract or do." ## Your method 1. **Read `knowledge/`** first — understand the architecture, endpoints, and config touchpoints. You can't attack what you don't understand. 2. **Open `playbooks/`** — each `NN-*.md` file is an attack class. The seed cases inside are starting points, not exhaustive. Run each, observe responses, and **think one step further** for variants. 3. **Iterate creatively** — if a seed case returns 200 when it should be 401, that's a finding. If it returns 401, try mutating the request: change headers, swap methods, try different URLs in the same family. Modern attackers chain weaknesses. 4. **Read source code** — the codebase is open in your workspace. Where does auth get enforced? What middleware exists? What happens at process boundaries? Reading is often more effective than blind probing. 5. **File findings** — see `findings/README.md` for the template. One finding per discrete weakness. Strong evidence > volume. 6. **Track progress** — mark playbooks ✅ as their cases are exhausted, ⬜ as you find new variants to add, ❌ as you discover weaknesses. ## Your scope In scope (please test these): - Authentication bypass (when auth is implemented) - Session fixation, replay, tampering - Cross-site request forgery - Misconfiguration of localhost-trust / X-Forwarded-* spoofing - Credential storage weaknesses (file permissions, log leakage) - Direct access to UTA service from outside Alice - WebSocket / SSE auth boundary - Public-mode safety net (refuse to start with bind ≠ localhost + no auth) - Header-based attacks (clickjacking, CSP gaps, mime sniffing) - Token brute-forcing / rate limit gaps Out of scope (do not perform these): - Denial-of-service / resource exhaustion - Network-level attacks (ARP spoofing, DNS hijacking) - Real broker order placement on live accounts — use mock/paper only - Permanent destruction of user data — always back up before destructive tests, restore after - Supply-chain audits of npm dependencies (separate workstream) - Social engineering / phishing the operator - Anything requiring root on the host (root = trivial game over, not interesting) - Side-channel / timing attacks on argon2 / cryptographic primitives (assume they work as specified) ## Your output After a session, the operator wants to see: 1. **Findings filed** in `findings/YYYY-MM-DD-<title>.md` — one per weakness 2. **Updated playbook status** — ✅ for fully tested classes, with notes on what you tried beyond the seed cases 3. **A short summary** in your final reply: "I ran N playbooks, found M confirmed weaknesses, filed in findings/, recommend prioritizing X" A finding is more valuable than a hunch. If you suspect something but can't demonstrate it, note it in the playbook's "extension hints" section instead of a finding. ## Your mindset - **Skeptical**: assume the developer made the obvious mistake until proven otherwise. Most weaknesses are boring. - **Layered**: each playbook is one layer. Combine layers when one alone is insufficient (e.g., CSRF + localhost-trust bypass = real attack chain). - **Honest**: don't report a "finding" that requires unrealistic preconditions (e.g., "if attacker has root, they can read auth.json"). That's not a finding, that's defining root. - **Reproducible**: every finding should have a curl command or script that demonstrates it from a clean state. - **Constructive**: each finding should suggest a remediation hint, even if brief. ## Ready Read `knowledge/architecture.md` and `knowledge/endpoints.md` to orient yourself, then open `playbooks/01-auth-bypass.md` and start working. Good hunting.

Instructions flagged against the user

D6 · Unsafe Request Handling
“Your job: find ways to bypass authentication, access protected endpoints, leak credentials, or compromise the trading workspace.”
The prompt instructs an AI agent to actively perform security attacks including authentication bypass, credential leaking, session tampering, CSRF exploitation, and header-based attacks. While framed as legitimate red-team security testing, it directs the AI to engage in offensive security operations — finding ways to bypass authentication, leak credentials, and compromise systems. This is the type of content that could be used maliciously, and the prompt provides a detailed methodology for conducting these attacks with no guardrails requiring operator verification of authorization.
D6 · Unsafe Request Handling
“Authentication bypass (when auth is implemented)”
The prompt instructs an AI agent to actively perform security attacks including authentication bypass, credential leaking, session tampering, CSRF exploitation, and header-based attacks. While framed as legitimate red-team security testing, it directs the AI to engage in offensive security operations — finding ways to bypass authentication, leak credentials, and compromise systems. This is the type of content that could be used maliciously, and the prompt provides a detailed methodology for conducting these attacks with no guardrails requiring operator verification of authorization.
D6 · Unsafe Request Handling
“Session fixation, replay, tampering”
The prompt instructs an AI agent to actively perform security attacks including authentication bypass, credential leaking, session tampering, CSRF exploitation, and header-based attacks. While framed as legitimate red-team security testing, it directs the AI to engage in offensive security operations — finding ways to bypass authentication, leak credentials, and compromise systems. This is the type of content that could be used maliciously, and the prompt provides a detailed methodology for conducting these attacks with no guardrails requiring operator verification of authorization.
D6 · Unsafe Request Handling
“Cross-site request forgery”
The prompt instructs an AI agent to actively perform security attacks including authentication bypass, credential leaking, session tampering, CSRF exploitation, and header-based attacks. While framed as legitimate red-team security testing, it directs the AI to engage in offensive security operations — finding ways to bypass authentication, leak credentials, and compromise systems. This is the type of content that could be used maliciously, and the prompt provides a detailed methodology for conducting these attacks with no guardrails requiring operator verification of authorization.
D6 · Unsafe Request Handling
“Token brute-forcing / rate limit gaps”
The prompt instructs an AI agent to actively perform security attacks including authentication bypass, credential leaking, session tampering, CSRF exploitation, and header-based attacks. While framed as legitimate red-team security testing, it directs the AI to engage in offensive security operations — finding ways to bypass authentication, leak credentials, and compromise systems. This is the type of content that could be used maliciously, and the prompt provides a detailed methodology for conducting these attacks with no guardrails requiring operator verification of authorization.

Questions about OpenAlice's system prompt

Does OpenAlice's system prompt contain instructions that work against the user?

Yes. 1 instruction in OpenAlice's system prompt was flagged as working against the person the product is talking to, most of them under unsafe request handling. Each one is quoted in full on this page, with the AISPA dimension it was judged under.

How long is OpenAlice's system prompt?

5,153 characters across 1 prompt on this page. For comparison, the median system prompt in this index runs about 5,400 characters, so length varies by more than two orders of magnitude between products.

How many versions of OpenAlice's system prompt are on record?

1. Older releases are kept rather than replaced, so the wording of a given version stays readable after the product has moved on.

Where did this OpenAlice system prompt come from?

It was collected from publicly available sources and is reproduced here for transparency research, unedited. This site does not extract prompts from products itself.

How was OpenAlice's system prompt audited?

Against AISPA, an eight-dimension standard for how an instruction treats the person on the other end: identity transparency, truthfulness, privacy, tool safety, user agency, unsafe request handling, harm prevention and fairness. This audit was ai audit. The method is described in the paper behind the standard.

How this page was made

The prompt text above is reproduced verbatim from a public source. Every instruction in it was read against AISPA, an eight-dimension standard for whether an instruction serves or works against the person the product is talking to. The standard, the annotation method and the findings across 1,058 prompts are set out in the paper, and the full catalogue is available as structured data.

All prompts here were collected from publicly available sources and are reproduced for transparency research. Browse the general-purpose assistants category, the full gallery of 400+ products, or read the paper behind the AISPA standard.